Density flow over networks: A mean-field game theoretic approach by Bauso, D. et al.
	



	
	


	

	
				
  
	

!
∀#∀∃%∀&∋	


∀()∗+, −#	.

	
(
/0%/	
	
1∋
%
	12223

#

3
	
 412223

#
3
	
∀#/5, 0,6∀∗+,7∀

(%∀3
∀8(1			
2	2	
2%∀4704767
18!960,07606670
		:

%,+,,+3#3∗+,76+4∗6


	;	

				

Density Flow over Networks: A Mean-field Game Theoretic Approach
Dario Bauso, Xuan Zhang and Antonis Papachristodoulou
Abstract—A distributed routing control algorithm for dy-
namic networks has recently been presented in the literature.
The networks were modeled using time evolution of density
at network edges and the routing control algorithm allowed
edge density to converge to a Wardrop equilibrium, which was
characterized by an equal traffic density on all used paths.
We borrow the idea and rearrange the density model to recast
the problem within the framework of mean-field games. The
contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, we provide a
mean-field game formulation of the problem at hand. Second,
we illustrate an extended state space solution approach. Third,
we study the stochastic case where the density evolution is
driven by a Brownian motion.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study a routing problem over a network.
The problem setup involves a population of individuals or
players traversing the edges of a network in the attempt to
reach a destination node starting from a source node. From
a microscopic standpoint, each player jumps from one edge
to an adjacent one according to a continuous-time Markov
model. Players select the transition rates, which represent
the control. From a macroscopic perspective, each edge is
characterized by dynamics describing the time evolution
of the density of players on that edge. These dynamics
take the form of a classical forward Kolmogorov Ordinary
Differential Equation (ODE). In the second part of the paper,
we extend our analysis to the case where the Kolmogorov
equation turns into a Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE)
driven by a Brownian motion.
Main results. For the problem at hand we highlight
three main results. First, we provide a mean-field game
formulation of the problem (see Theorem 1). Second, we
illustrate an extended state space solution approach (see
Theorem 2). Third, we study the stochastic case where
the density evolution is driven by a Brownian motion (see
Theorem 3).
Related literature. The current paper finds inspiration
in the distributed routing problem presented in [5], [6].
We provide a detailed analysis of a similar problem via
mean-field games theory. The theory on mean-field games
originated in the work of M. Y. Huang, P. E. Caines and
R. Malhame´ [8], [9], [10] and independently in that of
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J. M. Lasry and P. L. Lions [12], [13], [14], where the
now standard terminology of Mean-Field Games (MFG) was
introduced. In addition to this, the closely related notion of
Oblivious Equilibria for large population dynamic games was
introduced by G. Weintraub, C. Benkard and B. Van Roy [20]
in the framework of Markov Decision Processes.
The problem we analyze in this paper has striking sim-
ilarities with the optimal planning problem [1], [4], [15],
[17] which in turn can be linked back to mean-field games.
Essentially, in optimal planning problems the idea is to drive
the density of players from a given initial configuration to
a target one at a given time by an appropriate design of the
optimal decisions of the agents.
Mean-field games arise in several application domains
such as economics, physics, biology, and network engineer-
ing (see [1], [2], [7], [10], [16], [18]). Explicit solutions in
terms of mean-field equilibria are not common unless the
problem has a linear quadratic structure [3]. In this sense,
a variety of solution schemes have been recently proposed
based on discretization and or numerical approximations
[1]. Mean-field games have precursors in anonymous games
and aggregative games building upon the notion of mass
interaction and can be seen as a stationary mean-field in dy-
namic discrete time [11]. More recently, robustness notions
have been introduced in mean-field games. Robust mean-
field games aim to achieve robust performance or stability in
the presence of unknown disturbances when there is a large
number of players. Their relationship with risk-sensitive
games and risk-neutral games has been analyzed in [19].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we illustrate the problem and introduce the model. In Section
III we present the main results of the paper. In Section IV we
provide numerical examples. Finally, in Section V we draw
some conclusions.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM SET-UP
Let a graphG = (V,E) be given where V = {1, · · · , n} is
the set of vertices and E = {1, · · · ,m} the set of edges. Let
us denote by ε+(i) and ε−(i) the sets of outgoing edges from
i and incoming edges to i respectively, ∀i ∈ V . We consider
a “large population” of individuals or players of which each
one is characterized by a time-varying state X(t) ∈ E at
time t ∈ [0, T ], where [0, T ] is the time horizon window.
The routing policy is described by a vector-valued function
α(·) : R+ → [0, 1]
m, t 7→ α(t) where [0, 1]m denotes the
m-dimensional column vector whose entries are within the
interval [0, 1]. Moreover, we have
∑
e∈ε+(i) αe = 1 where
∀i ∈ V and αe is the e
th entry of α(t). In other words, α(t) is
equivalent to ∆|ε
+(1)|×· · ·×∆|ε
+(n)| where ∆|ε
+(i)| denotes
the simplex in R|ε
+(i)| and |ε+(i)| is the cardinality of set
ε+(i) (number of outgoing edges from i), ∀i ∈ V . Let k ∈ E
be the player’s state. The state evolution of a single player
is then captured by the following continuous-time Markov
stochastic process:
{X(t), t ≥ 0}, qkj(h, φk, αj) =


αjφkh j ∈ Adj(k),
1− φkh, j = k,
0, otherwise,
(1)
where qkj(h, φk, αj) (qkj) are the infinitesimal transition
probabilities from k to j, h is the infinitesimal time interval,
φk ∈ R+ is the transition rate in state k ∈ E, and Adj(k) =
{j ∈ E| j ∈ ε+(i), k ∈ ε−(i)} represents the set of adjacent
edges to k.
Denote by ρ ∈ [0, 1]m the vector of densities on edges,
which means that
∑
e∈E ρe = 1, ρe is the e
th entry of ρ. Let
us define the flow function f(·) : [0, 1]m → Rm+ , ρ 7→ f(ρ),
which maps densities into flows for each edge. In this paper,
we assume the following linear rule fe(ρ) = φeρe, where
fe(ρ) is the e
th entry of f(ρ). The density evolution can be
described by the Kolmogorov ODE given by
ρ˙(t) =
(
B˜T (α)Bˆ − I
)
f(ρ), (2)
where
• the matrix-valued function B˜(·) : [0, 1]m → [0, 1]n×m,
α 7→ B˜(α), which relates nodes to outgoing edges, i.e.,
B˜ij(α) = αj if j ∈ ε
+(i) and B˜ij(α) = 0 otherwise.
Here [0, 1]n×m denotes the n ×m-dimensional matrix
whose entries are within the interval [0, 1], and B˜ij(α)
is the entry in the ith row and jth column of B˜(α).
• the matrix Bˆ ∈ {0, 1}n×m relates nodes to incoming
edges, i.e., Bˆij = 1 if j ∈ ε
−(i) and Bˆij = 0 otherwise.
Here {0, 1}n×m denotes the n×m-dimensional matrix
whose entries are either 0 or 1, and Bˆij is the entry in
the ith row and jth column of Bˆ.
Equation (2) establishes that the density variation on each
edge is a consequence of a discrepancy between the out-
going flow and the incoming flow on the same edge. The
former is captured by the term f(ρ) whereas the latter is
represented by B˜T (α)Bˆf(ρ). Then density variation depends
on the difference B˜T (α)Bˆf(ρ) − f(ρ) which gives (2).
Note that B˜T (α) is a column (left) stochastic matrix, i.e.,∑
i=1,··· ,m(B˜
T (α))ij = 1 for all j = 1, · · · , n.
Assume that the graph is acyclic, and has one source node
s and one destination node d. Select a subset of paths from
s to d and call it P . Each element of P is an s − d path
{s, · · · , i, · · · , d}. Let the matrix C ∈ {0, 1}|P|×m be given
which relates paths to edges. Each row of C contains ones or
zeros depending on what edges are included in the path. We
can define the output vector-valued function y(·) : R+ →
R
|P|, t 7→ y(t), which represents the collective density on
each path and can be expressed as y(t) = Cρ(t).
In order to achieve a Wardrop equilibrium, i.e., uniform
distribution over all available paths, for each player, consider
a running cost g(·) : E × [0, 1]m → [0,+∞[, (x, ρ) 7→
g(x, ρ) of the form below, where M is the consensus
manifold/Wardrop equilibria set:
g(x, ρ) = dist(ρ,M), (3)
M = {∃p ∈ [0, 1], y(t) = p[1]|P|}, (4)
where dist(ρ,M) denotes the distance from the vector ρ to
the manifold M, and the [1]|P| denotes the |P|-dimensional
vector whose entries are 1. The problem in its generic form
is then the following:
Problem 1: Design a routing policy to minimize the out-
put disagreement, i.e., each player solves the following
problem:

infα(·) J(x, α(·), ρ[·](·)),
J(·) = E
[ ∫ T
0
g(X(t), ρ(t))dt+ g(X(T ), ρ(T ))
]
,
{X(t), t ≥ 0} as in (1).
(5)
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we highlight three main results. First, we
provide a mean-field game formulation of the problem at
hand (see Theorem 1). Second, we illustrate an extended state
space solution approach (see Theorem 2). Third, we study
the stochastic case where the density evolution is driven by
a Brownian motion (see Theorem 3).
A. Mean-field game formulation
Let us denote by v(x, t) the value of the optimization
problem starting from time t at state x. The first step is
to show that the problem results in the following mean-field
game system for the unknown scalar functions v(x, t) and
ρ(t) when each player behaves according to (5):
Theorem 1: The mean-field system for the routing prob-
lem in Problem 1 takes on the form:

v˙(x, t) +H(x,∆(v), t) = 0 in E × [0, T [,
v(x, T ) = g(x, ρ(T )), ∀x ∈ E,
ρ˙(t) =
(
B˜T (α∗)Bˆ − I
)
f(ρ) in [0, T [,
ρ(0) = ρ0, ρ0 given,
(6)
H(x,∆(v), t) is the Hamiltonian function given by
H(x,∆(v), t) = inf
α
{∑
z∈E qxz(v(z, t)
−v(x, t)) + g(x, ρ)
}
.
(7)
In the expression above, ∆(v) denotes the difference of the
value function computed in two successive states, qxz is the
transition rate given in (1). The optimal time-varying control
α∗(x, t) is given by
α∗(x, t) ∈ argmin
α
{∑
z∈E qxz(v(z, t)
−v(x, t)) + g(x, ρ)
}
.
(8)
Proof: Let us start by noticing that the third and
fourth equations of (6) are the forward Kolmogorov equation
and the corresponding boundary condition on the initial
distribution law. To prove the first equation of (6), we know
that from dynamic programming it holds:
v˙(x, t) + inf
α
{∑
z∈E qxz(v(z, t)− v(x, t))
+g(x, ρ)
}
= 0 in E × [0, T [,
By introducing the Hamiltonian H(x,∆(v), t) given in (7),
we obtain the first equation. Note that the transition rates
depend on the routing policy/control α. This is then obtained
as the minimizer in the computation of the Hamiltonian as
expressed by (8). For the first part of the proof, it is left to
notice that the second equation is the boundary condition on
the terminal penalty.
The mean-field game system (6) appears in the form of
two coupled ODEs intertwined in a forward-backward way.
The first equation in (6) is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation with variable v(x, t) and parametrized in
ρ(·). Given the boundary condition on final state (second
equation in (6)), and assuming a given population behavior
captured by ρ(·), the HJB equation is solved backwards
and returns the value function and best-response behavior
of the players given by (8). The HJB equation is coupled
with a second ODE, which is the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov
(FPK) (third equation in (6)), defined on variable ρ(·) and
parametrized in α∗(x, t). Given the boundary condition on
initial distribution ρ(0) = ρ0 (fourth equation in (6)), and
assuming a given individual behavior described by α∗, the
FPK equation is solved forward and returns the population
behavior time evolution ρ(t).
B. State space extension
Our solution approach to (6) involves expanding the state
space including ρ as an additional state variable. Then, we
look for a new value function V (x, ρ, t) (note that we have
abused the notation V and its meaning should be clear from
the context) which depends not only on x but rather also on
the density vector ρ. With the above reasoning in mind the
mean-field system of the problem at hand can be rewritten
as follows.
Lemma 1: The mean-field system for the routing problem
in Problem 1 in extended form appears as:

∂tV (x, ρ, t) + H˜(x, ρ,∆(v), ∂ρV, t) = 0
in E × [0, 1]m × [0, T [,
V (x, ρ, T ) = g(x, ρ(T )), ∀(x, ρ) ∈ E × [0, 1]m,
(9)
where
H˜(x, ρ,∆(v), ∂ρV, t) = inf
α
{∑
z∈E qxz(V (z, ρ, t)
−V (x, ρ, t)) + ∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
T
[(
B˜T (α)Bˆ
−I
)
f(ρ)
]
+ g(x, ρ)
}
,
(10)
and the optimal time-varying control α∗(x, ρ, t) is given by
α∗(x, ρ, t) ∈ argmin
α
{∑
z∈E qxz(V (z, ρ, t)
−V (x, ρ, t)) + ∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
[(
B˜T (α)Bˆ
−I
)
f(ρ)
]
+ g(x, ρ)
}
.
(11)
Proof: From dynamic programming we obtain
∂tV (x, ρ, t) + inf
α
{∑
z∈E qxz(V (z, ρ, t)
−V (x, ρ, t)) + ∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
T
[ (
B˜T (α)Bˆ − I
)
f(ρ)
]
+g(x, ρ)
}
= 0 in E × [0, 1]m × [0, T [.
By introducing the Hamiltonian H˜(x, ρ,∆(v), ∂ρV, t) given
in (10), the first equation is proven. To prove (11), observe
that the optimal control is the minimizer in the computation
of the extended Hamiltonian. It remains to notice that the
second equation in (9) is the boundary condition on the
terminal penalty.
Assumption 1: (Attainability condition) The value of the
projected game, val[λ], is negative for every λ ∈ Rm, i.e.,
val[λ] = inf
α
{
λT
[
qx· + ρ˙
]}
= inf
α
{
∑
z∈E(qxz + ρ˙z)λz} < 0, ∀λ ∈ R
m,
(12)
where qx· = [qxz]z∈E ∈ R
m.
This assumption ensures that for a given feasible target
manifold, there always exists a routing policy α(t) that drives
the edge density ρ towards the manifold (λ can be viewed
as the vector connecting the current density projection point
on the target manifold and the current density point, with
the direction pointing out from the target manifold). We can
then establish the following result.
Theorem 2: Let Assumption 1 hold true. Then the mean-
field game for the routing problem is given by

∂tV (x, ρ, t) + val[∂ρV (x, ρ, t)] + g(x, ρ) = 0
in E × [0, 1]m × [0, T [,
V (x, ρ, T ) = g(x, ρ(T )), ∀(x, ρ) ∈ E × [0, 1]m.
(13)
Furthermore, the optimal control is:
α∗(x, ρ, t) =
argmin
α
{
∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
T
[(
B˜T (α)Bˆ − I
)
f(ρ)
]}
.
(14)
Proof: From (12) we have
val[∂ρV (x, ρ, t)] = inf
α
{
∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
T
[
qx· + ρ˙
]}
= inf
α
{
∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
T
[
qx· +
(
B˜T (α)Bˆ − I
)
f(ρ)
]}
= H˜(x, ρ,∆(v), ∂ρV, t)− g(x, ρ).
Invoking Lemma 1, and the first equation in (9), we obtain
the first equation in (13). The second equation in (13) is
again the boundary condition on the terminal penalty. It
remain to notice that the optimal control is the minimizer
in the computation of the extended Hamiltonian and thus is
obtained from (14).
C. Stochastic case
In this section, we analyze the case where the density
evolves according to a stochastic differential equation driven
by a Brownian motion. The Kolmogorov equation is then
replaced by a geometric Brownian motion dynamics as
illustrated below:
dρ(t) =
(
B˜T (α)Bˆ − I
)
f(ρ)dt+σdist(ρ,M)dB(t). (15)
Extending the state space as in the earlier case, and intro-
ducing the extended Hamiltonian for the stochastic case as
H˜(x, ρ,∆(v), ∂ρV, t) = inf
α
{∑
z∈E qxz(V (z, ρ, t)
−V (x, ρ, t)) + ∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
T
[(
B˜T (α)Bˆ
−I
)
f(ρ)
]
+ g(x, ρ)
}
,
(16)
the mean-field system turns into the system of equations
below in the value function V (x, ρ, t) in E× [0, 1]m× [0, T [:


∂tV (x, ρ, t) + H˜(x, ρ,∆(v), ∂ρV, t)
+σ
2
2 dist
2(ρ,M)Tr
(
∂2ρρV (x, ρ, t)
)
= 0
in E × [0, 1]m × [0, T [,
V (x, ρ, T ) = g(x, ρ(T )), ∀(x, ρ) ∈ E × [0, 1]m,
(17)
where the optimal time-varying control α∗(x, ρ, t) is ob-
tained as
α∗(x, ρ, t) ∈ argmin
α
{∑
z∈E qxz(V (z, ρ, t)
−V (x, ρ, t)) + ∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
T
[(
B˜T (α)Bˆ
−I
)
f(ρ)
]
+ g(x, ρ)
}
.
(18)
Assumption 2: (Expected attainability condition) The
expected value of the projected game, val[λ], is negative
for every λ ∈ Rm, i.e.,
expval[λ]
= inf
α
E
{
λT
[
qx· +
(
B˜T (α)Bˆ − I
)
f(ρ)
]}
= inf
α
E{
∑
z∈E(qxz + ρ˙z)λz} < 0, ∀λ ∈ R
m.
(19)
We can then establish the following result.
Theorem 3: Let Assumpion 2 hold true. Then, the mean-
field game for the routing problem is given by

∂tV (x, ρ, t) + val[∂ρV (x, ρ, t)] + g(x, ρ)
+σ
2
2 dist
2(ρ,M)Tr
(
∂2ρρV (x, ρ, t)
)
= 0
in E × [0, 1]m × [0, T [,
V (x, ρ, T ) = g(x, ρ(T )), ∀(x, ρ) ∈ E × [0, 1]m.
(20)
Furthermore, the optimal control is:
α∗(x, ρ, t) =
argmin
α
{
∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
T
[(
B˜T (α)Bˆ − I
)
f(ρ)
]}
.
(21)
Proof: Let us observe that from (19) we have
expval[∂ρV (x, ρ, t)] = inf
α
E
{
∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
T
[
qx· + ρ˙
]}
= inf
α
E
{
∂ρV (x, ρ, t)
T
[
qx· +
(
B˜T (α)Bˆ − I
)
f(ρ)
]}
= H˜(x, ρ,∆(v), ∂ρV, t)− g(x, ρ).
From the above equation and invoking the first equation
in (17), we obtain the first equation in (20). The second
equation in (20) represents the boundary condition on the
terminal penalty. To conclude our proof we notice that the
optimal control is the minimizer in the computation of the
extended Hamiltonian and thus is obtained from (21).
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Consider the following example, consisting of 4 vertices
and 5 edges, as shown in Fig. 1 (vertex ’S’ stands for the
source and vertex ’D’ stands for the destination, edge e is
marked with fe, the incoming flow f0 is equal to the outgoing
flow f6 = f4 + f5).
Fig. 1: Network system.
The matrices introduced in the sections above are
B˜T (α) =


α1 0 0
0 α2 0
α3 0 0
0 α4 0
0 0 α5


B˜ =

 1 0 1 0 00 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


The density evolution expressed by (2) takes on the form,
where we use fe(ρe(t)) = φρe(t):

ρ˙1(t) = α1(t)(φρ4(t) + φρ5(t))− φρ1(t)
ρ˙2(t) = α2(t)φρ1(t)− φρ2(t)
ρ˙3(t) = α3(t)(φρ4(t) + φρ5(t))− φρ3(t)
ρ˙4(t) = α4(t)φρ1(t)− φρ4(t)
ρ˙5(t) = α5(t)(φρ2(t) + φρ3(t))− φρ5(t)
(22)
and 

α1(t) + α3(t) = 1
α2(t) + α4(t) = 1
α5(t) = 1
(23)
Let us consider the paths {1, 4}, {1, 2, 5} and {3, 5}. In
other words, P =
{
{1, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {3, 5}
}
which corre-
sponds to defining an output

 y1(t)y2(t)
y3(t)

 =

 1 0 0 1 01 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
C


ρ1(t)
ρ2(t)
ρ3(t)
ρ4(t)
ρ5(t)


Deterministic case. We first consider the deterministic case.
Table I shows the parameters of the overall system. Ac-
cording to Theorem 2, we have the following Algorithm to
solve the distributed routing problem. The simulations are
carried out with MATLAB on an Inter(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E31245 at 3.30GHz and 8 GB of RAM, and the results are
Parameter Value Variable Initial Value
φ 0.8 ρ(t) (0.3, 0.5, 0.2, 0, 0)
Time step h 0.01 α(t) (0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.5, 1)
Time span T 20
TABLE I: Parameters of the overall system.
Algorithm
Input: Set of parameters as in Table I.
Output: Density ρ(t), policy α(t) and dist(ρ(t),M)
1 : Initialize: Set of initial values as in Table I.
2 : for time t = 0, h, 2h, . . . , T − h do
3 : compute projected point of ρ(t) on M
4 : compute the optimal control α∗(t) using
Theorem 2, and the distance dist(ρ(t),M)
5 : set β(0) = α(t)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , 100 do
compute
β(k + 1) = β(k) + h100 (α
∗(t)− β(k))
end for
set α(t) = (β1(101), β2(101), 1− β1(101),
1− β2(101), 1)
6 : compute ρ(t+ h)
7 : end for
8 : STOP
illustrated in Figures 2-4. The run time of the simulation is
around 25 seconds. Since
∑
e ρ˙e(t) = 0 (i.e., conservation
law holds),
∑
e ρe(t) =
∑
e ρe(0) = 1 always holds, which
is shown in Fig. 2. When achieving consensus, ρ2(t) = 0
holds, indicating that all players choose either leaving the
source vertex through edge 1 and returning it through edge
4, or leaving through edge 3 and going back through edge
5. Moreover, the players choose these two routes almost
equiprobably, i.e., α1 ≈ α3 ≈ 0.5, as illustrated in Fig.
3. The distance from the consensus manifold converges to
zero, as illustrated in Fig. 4. Note that in order to avoid
chirping in α(t), we have introduced lowpass dynamics
β˙(t) = α∗(t) − β(t) (the relevant transfer function is
β(s) = 1
s+1α
∗(s) which is actually a lowpass filter for α(t)),
corresponding to Step 5 in the Algorithm.
Stochastic case.We now consider the stochastic case. In this
case, the dynamics of the network (22) change to

ρ˙1(t) = α1(t)(φρ4(t) + φρ5(t))− φρ1(t) + w1(t)
ρ˙2(t) = α2(t)φρ1(t)− φρ2(t) + w2(t)
ρ˙3(t) = α3(t)(φρ4(t) + φρ5(t))− φρ3(t) + w3(t)
ρ˙4(t) = α4(t)φρ1(t)− φρ4(t) + w4(t)
ρ˙5(t) = α5(t)(φρ2(t) + φρ3(t))− φρ5(t) + w5(t)
(24)
where we(t) represents the Gaussian noise whose mean is
0 and variance is 12σ
2dist2(ρ(t),M). The above algorithm
can still solve the distributed routing problem. We continue
to use the parameters in Table I, set σ = 1, run 50 different
Monte Carlo trajectories, and compute the average value of
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Fig. 2: Simulation results of the deterministic case: density.
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Fig. 3: Simulation results of the deterministic case: routing
policy (α5(t) = 1 holds all the time).
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Fig. 4: Simulation results of the deterministic case: distance
to the consensus manifold.
these trajectories (see Figures 5-7). We can see that the
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Fig. 5: Simulation results of the stochastic case: average
density.
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Fig. 6: Simulation results of the stochastic case: average
routing policy (α5(t) = 1 holds all the time).
average trajectories are almost the same as those in the
deterministic case. Moreover, the average trajectory of α(t)
is now much more smooth. The sampled average distance
from the consensus manifold converges to zero.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have provided a mean-field game formulation of a
distributed routing problem. The problem intersects recent
research on optimal planning and transportation. Future
research will address the presence of adversarial disturbances
in the spirit of H∞ optimal control.
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